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This paper uses a semi-endogenous growth model to identify possible sources
for three interrelated stylised di⁄erences between the EU and the US, namely a
higher level of productivity and knowledge investment and larger skill premia in
the US compared to the EU. The model allows us to explain these di⁄erences in
terms of di⁄erences in subsidies to R&D, mark ups, administrative entry barriers
and ￿nancial frictions. The paper provides a ranking about the relative importance
of these factors. Goods market competition and both administrative and ￿nancial
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Western Europe has caught up with the US in terms of productivity in the post war period,
but this process came to an end in the mid 1990s. Since then the productivity gap with
the US has slightly widened again to more than 10%. This can be seen as evidence of
conditional convergence, i.e. European institutions, technologies and endowments prevent
full convergence of productivity levels. There are other important stylised di⁄erences
between the two regions. The US invests more in knowledge and this is re￿ ected in an R&D
share of about 3% compared to 2% for the former EU15. This di⁄erence in knowledge
investment has persisted since a long time, despite e⁄orts of European policymakers to
close this gap. Another important stylised fact is the size of the skill premium, where the
US shows a wider dispersion of wages across skill groups. For instance, for high skilled
wages in the education sector, a proxy for the wage level of R&D workers, there exists
a skill premium relative to medium skilled workers of 39% in the US vs. 34.6% in the
former EU15.
There has been a long debate on how these persistent di⁄erences could possibly be
explained. Interest has focused on the productivity gap. There is a sizeable literature
which blames product market regulations as a major reason for the income gap. In a
simulation exercise Bayoumi et al. (2004) estimates that increasing competition in the
goods market to US levels could increase GDP per capita by about 7%. Deeper and more
e¢ cient ￿nancial markets, especially venture capital markets in the US (see Bottazzi et al.
(2001)) are also regarded as an important explanatory factor. In a recent empirical study,
Aghion and Scarpetta (2007) conclude that ￿nancial constraints related to entry could be
as important as labour market rigidities in terms of obstacles to growth. The consequences
of di⁄erences in goods and ￿nancial markets for knowledge investment have so far been
less explored. Though there exists some literature on the e⁄ects of ￿nancing constraints,
the emphasis has been on ￿scal factors for explaining di⁄erences in R&D spending. The
factors which are regarded as important for explaining the productivity and knowledge
investment gap are even less prominent when it comes to assessing determinants of skill
1premia and permanent di⁄erences in these across the Atlantic.
This paper tries to ￿ll this gap by mapping di⁄erences in product markets, ￿nancial
markets and R&D policies onto these three stylised di⁄erences using an endogenous growth
model. This allows us to look at the relative importance of important structural features
distinguishing the two economies for explaining the di⁄erences in productivity, knowledge
investment and skill premia. Endogenous growth models do obviously suggest that links
exist between productivity, R&D investment and skill premia and therefore serve as an
appropriate tool to look at all three aspects simultaneously.
In this exercise we make use of a wealth of empirical evidence which has been gathered
in recent years on di⁄erences in institutions, technologies, endowments and policies be-
tween Europe and the US. We focus our comparison on the former EU15, i.e. we only look
at the old member states that were part of the European Union pre 2004 enlargement,
and exclude the new member states which generally have a much larger gap vis-a-vis the
US. Concerning goods markets we use various indicators such as mark up estimates as
well as indicators of administrative entry barriers as well as ￿nancial frictions to char-
acterise the state of product market competition. Concerning knowledge production we
make use of recent empirical estimates as presented by Bottazzi and Peri (2007). We
control for di⁄erences in endowments in both economies by using information on the skill
composition of the labour force. Concerning ￿scal measures we concentrate on R&D tax
credits as measured by the OECD B-index.
A choice has to be made on the type of endogenous growth model we want to use for
this exercise. Aghion and Howitt (2006) distinguish three main endogenous growth para-
digms. The ￿rst version is the AK-theory, which is a neoclassical growth model without
imposing diminishing returns on capital. The second version of endogenous growth models
followed the product-variety paradigm (see Romer (1990)) in which innovation generates
endogenous productivity growth by creating new varieties of products. The third par-
adigm arises from industrial organization theory (see Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1998)),
and it is commonly referred to as "Schumpeterian" growth theory. This paradigm in-
volves the Schumpeterian notion of creative destruction via focusing on quality improving
2innovations which forces obsolete products out of the market. Recent models of directed
technological change developed in Acemoglu (1998, 2002 and 2007) can be considered as
new paradigm in which the direction of technological change is also endogenized.
The product-variety paradigm along with some earlier R&D based models in the liter-
ature shares the prediction of empirically unjusti￿ed scale-e⁄ects: if the level of resources
devoted to R&D - for instance measured by the number of scientists engaged in R&D -
is doubled, then the per capita growth rate of output should also double in the steady
state. Jones (1995, 2005) o⁄ers an alternative setting for the product-variety paradigm,
a semi-endogenous growth model which is free from the inconsistent scale-e⁄ects. In this
paper we extend the Jones model to capture the endogenous development of R&D. The
preference for semi-endogenous growth models to fully endogenous structures is also sup-
ported by Bottazzi and Peri (2007) which ￿nds evidence of weak scale e⁄ects as implied
by semi-endogenous models of growth. In addition to the R&D framework, our model
also includes the disaggregation of labour into three skill-groups (low-, medium,- and
high-skilled) in order to capture di⁄erences in human capital endowments.
The paper is structured as follows. We begin with a description of the model, followed
by a section that provides details on the calibration. The next section presents the
simulation results to identify the possible sources for the productivity gap between the
EU and the US and the ￿nal section concludes.
2 Model
The model economy is populated by households, ￿nal and intermediate goods producing
￿rms, a research industry, a monetary and a ￿scal authority. In the ￿nal goods sector
￿rms produce di⁄erentiated goods which are imperfect substitutes for goods produced
abroad. Final good producers use a composite of intermediate goods and three types of
labour - low-, medium-, and high-skilled. Households buy the patents of designs pro-
duced by the R&D sector and license them to the intermediate goods producing ￿rms.
The intermediate sector is composed of monopolistically competitive ￿rms which pro-
duce intermediate products from rented capital input using the designs licensed from the
3household sector. The production of new designs takes place in research labs, employing
high skilled labour and making use of the existing stock of ideas. Technological change is
modelled as increasing product variety in the tradition of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
2.1 Households
The household sector consists of a continuum of households h 2 [0;1]. A share (1 ￿ ￿)
of these households are not liquidity constrained and indexed by i 2 [0;1 ￿ ￿]. They
have access to ￿nancial markets where they can buy and sell domestic assets (government
bonds), accumulate physical capital which they rent out to the intermediate sector, and
they also buy the patents of designs produced by the R&D sector and license them to the
intermediate goods producing ￿rms. Non-liquidity constrained households o⁄er medium
and high skilled labour services indexed by s 2 fM;Hg. The remaining share ￿ of
households is liquidity constrained and indexed by k 2 [1 ￿ ￿;1]. These households can not
trade in ￿nancial and physical assets and consume their disposable income each period.
Members of liquidity constrained households o⁄er low-skilled labour services only. For
each skill group we assume that households supply di⁄erentiated labour services to unions
which act as wage setters in monopolistically competitive labour markets. The unions
pool wage income and distribute it in equal proportions among their members. Nominal
rigidity in wage setting is introduced by assuming that the households face adjustment
costs for changing wages.
2.1.1 Non liquidity constrained households (medium-, and high-skilled)
Each non liquidity constrained household maximise an intertemporal utility function in
consumption and leisure subject to a budget constraint. These households makes decisions
about consumption (Ci
t), and labour supply (Li
t), the purchases of investment good (Ji
t),
the renting of physical capital stock (Ki
t), the purchases of new patents from the R&D
sector (J
A;i
t ), and the licensing of existing patents (Ai





t )1, transfer income from the government (TRi
t),and interest
1Notice, the households only make a decision about the level of employment but there is no distinc-
tion on the part of households between unemployment and non-participation. It is assumed that the
4income (it, iK
t and iA
t ). Hence, non-liquidity constrained households face the following
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The budget constraints are written in real terms with the price for patents P A
t and wages
W normalized with the price of domestic ￿nal goods. All ￿rms of the economy are
owned by non liquidity constrained households who share the total pro￿t of the ￿nal








j;t, where N and At denote the
number of ￿rms in the ￿nal and intermediate sector respectively. As shown by the budget
constraints, all households pay tw
t wage income taxes and tK
t capital income taxes less tax




A) after their earnings on
physical capital and patents. There is no perfect arbitrage between di⁄erent types of
assets. Also, when investing into tangible and intangible capital the household requires
premia rpK
t and rpA
t in order to cover the increased risk on the return related to these
assets. We de￿ne the real interest rate rt as equal to the nominal interest rate minus
government makes a decision how to classify the non working part of the population into unemployed
and non participants. The non-participation rate NPART must therefore be seen as a policy variable
characterising the generosity of the bene￿t system.
5expected in￿ ation: rt = it ￿ Et(￿t+1).
The utility function is additively separable in consumption (Ci
t) and leisure (1￿L
i;s
t ).
We assume log-utility for consumption and allow for habit persistence.
U(C
i







For leisure we assume CES preferences with common labour supply elasticity but a skill
speci￿c weight (!s) on leisure. This is necessary in order to capture di⁄erences in em-
ployment levels across skill groups. Thus preferences for leisure are given by









with ￿ > 0.
The investment decisions w.r.t. real capital are subject to convex adjustment costs,


















We denote with P C the corresponding utility based de￿ ator for the C and J aggregate.
The ￿rst order conditions of the household with respect to consumption, ￿nancial and


















































































t = 0: (4d)
Using the arbitrage conditions and neglecting the second order terms, investment is given












































Notice, the relevant discount factor for the investor is the nominal interest rate adjusted
by the trading friction minus the expected in￿ ation of investment goods (￿C
t+1).
Non-liquidity constrained households buy new patents of designs produced by the
R&D sector (IA
t ) and rent their total stock of design (At) at rental rate iA
t to intermediate
goods producers in period t. Households pay income tax at rate tK
t on the period return
of intangibles and they receive tax subsidies at rate ￿A. Hence, the ￿rst order conditions



















































t = 0 (5d)
























Equation (6) states that household require a rate of return on intangible capital which
is equal to the nominal interest rate minus the rate of change of the value of intangible
assets and also covers the cost of economic depreciation plus a risk premium. Governments
can a⁄ect investment decisions in intangible capital by giving tax incentives in the form of
tax credits and depreciation allowances or by lowering the tax on the return from patents.
72.1.2 Liquidity constrained households
Liquidity constrained households do not optimize but simply consume their current income
































Within each skill group a variety of labour services are supplied which are imperfect
substitutes to each other. Thus trade unions can charge a wage mark-up (1=￿W
t ) over the
reservation wage2.
The reservation wage is given as the marginal utility of leisure divided by the corre-
sponding marginal utility of consumption. The relevant net real wage to which the mark
up adjusted reservation wage is equated is the gross wage adjusted for labour taxes, con-
sumption taxes and unemployment bene￿ts, which act as a subsidy to leisure. Thus the


















for h 2 fi;kg and s 2 fL;M;Hg: (8)
2.1.4 Aggregation
The aggregate of any household speci￿c variable Xh











Hence aggregate consumption and employment is given by





2The mark-up depends on the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between di⁄erent types of labour
￿s and ￿ uctuations in the mark-up arise because of wage adjustment costs and the fact that a fraction
(1 ￿ sfw) of workers is indexing the growth rate of wages ￿w to wage in￿ ation in the previous period
￿w
t = 1 ￿ 1=￿s ￿ ￿W=￿s
￿
￿(sfw￿w












2.2.1 Final output producers
Since each ￿rm j (j = 1;::::;N) produces a variety of the domestic good which is an
imperfect substitute for the varieties produced by other ￿rms, it acts as a monopolistic
competitor facing a demand function with a price elasticity given by ￿d. Final output (Y j)
is produced using A varieties of intermediate inputs (x) with an elasticity of substitution
1=(1 ￿ ￿). The ￿nal good sector uses a labour aggregate and intermediate goods in a





















































Parameter ss is the population share of labour-force in subgroup s (low-, medium- and
high-skilled), Ls denotes the employment rate of population s, efs is the corresponding ef-
￿ciency unit, and ￿L is the elasticity of substitution between di⁄erent labour types. Note
that high-skilled labour in the ￿nal goods sector, LHY
t , is the total high-skill employ-
ment minus the high-skilled labour working for the R&D sector (LHA
t ). The employment
aggregates Ls




















The parameter ￿s > 1 determines the degree of substitutability among di⁄erent types of
labour. The above production function employs the idea of product variety framework
9proposed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and applied in the literature of international trade
and R&D di⁄usion3, and we will explicitly model the underlying development of R&D by
the semi-endogenous framework of Jones (1995 and 2005)4.
































where pxi;t and x
j
i;t are the price and volume of intermediate inputs and W s
t is a wage
index corresponding to the CES aggregate L
j;s
t . All prices and wages are normalized with
Pt, the price of domestic ￿nal goods. In a symmetric equilibrium, the demand for labour
















s ￿t = W
s
t ; s 2 fL;M;Hg (16a)













where ￿t = 1 ￿ 1=￿d.
2.2.2 Intermediate goods producers
The intermediate sector consists of monopolistically competitive ￿rms which have entered
the market by licensing a design from domestic households and by making an initial
payment FCA to overcome administrative entry barriers. Capital inputs are also rented
from the household sector for a rental rate of iK
t . Firms which have acquired a design can
transform each unit of capital into a single unit of an intermediate input. In a symmetric
equilibrium, the respective inverse demand functions of intermediate goods producing
￿rms are given as (16b).
3See Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1998).
4Butler and Pakko (1998) also applied Jones (1995) semi-endogenous growth framework to examine
the e⁄ect of endogenous technological change on the properties of a real business cycle model without
skill disaggregation.














Subject to a linear technology which allows to transform one unit of capital (ki) into one
unit of an intermediate good
xi = ki: (18)















Intermediate goods producers set prices as a mark up over marginal cost. Therefore prices
for the domestic market are given by:





The no-arbitrage condition requires that entry into the intermediate goods producing


















For an intermediate producer, entry costs consist of the licensing fee iA
t P A
t for the design
or patent which is a prerequisite of production of innovative intermediate goods and a
￿xed entry cost FCA.
2.3 R&D sector
Innovation corresponds to the discovery of a new variety of producer durables that pro-
vides an alternative way of producing the ￿nal good. The R&D sector hires high-skilled
labour (LHA














In this framework we allow for international R&D spillovers following Bottazzi and Peri
(2007). Parameters $ and ￿ measure the foreign and domestic spillover e⁄ects from
the aggregate international and domestic stock of knowledge (Aw and A) respectively.
Negative value for these parameters can be interpreted as the "￿shing out" e⁄ect, i.e.
when innovation decreases with the level of knowledge, while positive values refer to the
"standing on shoulders" e⁄ect and imply positive research spillovers. Note that ￿ = 1
would give back the strong scale e⁄ect feature of fully endogenous growth models with
respect to the domestic level of knowledge. Parameter ￿ can be interpreted as total factor
e¢ ciency of R&D production, while ￿ measures the elasticity of R&D production on the
number of researchers (LHA
t ). The international stock of knowledge grows exogenously
at rate gAw. We assume that the R&D sector is operated by a research institute which
employs high skilled labour at their market wage W H. We also assume that the research

















































where dt is the discount factor.
2.4 Policy
On the expenditure side we assume that government consumption, government transfers
and government investment are proportional to GDP and unemployment bene￿ts are













where the bene￿t replacement rate bs
t can be indexed to consumer prices and net wages
in di⁄erent degrees according to the following rule
b
s










t ); 0 ￿ ￿
c;￿
w ￿ 1: (26)
The government provides subsidies (St) on physical capital and R&D investments in the

























t are made up of taxes on consumption as well as capital and
labour income. Government debt (Bt) evolves according to





There is a lump-sum tax (T LS



















where bT is the government debt target.
2.5 Determinants of the long run level of labour productivity,
R&D share and skill premia
We use a slightly simpli￿ed version of the model with unit elasticity of substitution be-
tween skills, only two skill groups and inelastic supply of labour to derive the steady state
solutions for productivity, the R&D share and the skill premium (see the Appendix 1 for
a detailed derivation).
The most important determinant of labour productivity in this model is total factor
13productivity, represented by the variable A. In the steady state, A is a positive function
of the amount of labour devoted to research (see eq 22). As shown in the appendix the
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Eq. (30) shows that the share of R&D workers is highly dependent on the goods market
condition in the intermediate production sector, while mark ups in the ￿nal goods sector
do not have an impact on the allocation of resources into R&D.
Eq. (30) suggests that a shift of resource towards R&D requires an increase of the
mark up in intermediate production. In the intermediate sector positive mark ups are
required to cover the ￿xed costs associated with the acquisition of a patent which is a
prerequisite for market entry. What is relevant for entry of new ￿rms is the size of pro￿ts,
which is a positive function of the mark up and the scale of production (i. e. it is inversely
related to the number of intermediate producers). Why does a reduction in the mark up
in ￿nal goods production not lead to an increase in A? The reason is that there are various
opposing forces at work. First increased competition in the ￿nal goods sector increases
demand for intermediates and for labour. This increases pro￿ts in the intermediate sector
but it also increases the price of patents because of an increase in wages. The net result
is that each incumbent ￿rm is increasing production of the intermediate good but there is
no additional entry. Thus increasing competition in the ￿nal goods sector also increases
productivity, however this occurs via an increase in capital intensity and not via an
increase in TFP (see Appendix 1, eqs. A26 and A27).5 As can also be seen from eq. (30),
a reduction in entry barriers (fca) and an increase in R&D subsidies (￿) shifts labour
from production into research. In order to calculate productivity we ￿rst note that we
can express A as a positive function of the share of high skilled workers (LH
t ) and the
share of high skilled workers devoted to R&D (sL;A=Y)
5As shown in the appendix, decreasing the ￿nal goods mark-up will always lead to higher output per
















However for total economy labour productivity there is a trade o⁄between high skilled
workers devoted to research and production, i. e. shifting labour to research reduces the
e¢ ciency of the labour aggregate in ￿nal production. As shown in the appendix we arrive
at the following expression for labour productivity
yt =
￿






























Similarly the skill premium depends crucially on the share of workers in R&D pro-
duction. A high demand of R&D workers reduces the supply of high skilled workers in
the ￿nal goods production sector where relative wages are determined. As shown in the


















3 Identifying structural di⁄erences between the EU
and the US
3.1 Goods Market
The productivity gap between the US and the former EU15, as measured by GDP per
hour worked, amounted to 13% on average between 1998 and 20076. We identify the
intermediate sector as the manufacturing sector and the ￿nal goods sector as the ag-
gregate of all sectors without manufacturing. The manufacturing sector resembles the
intermediate sector along various dimensions. First, this sector is more R&D and patent
6We focus here on the di⁄erences between the two regions. There are sizeable di⁄erences across the
member states of the former EU15 and across states in the US but the variation in GDP per capita across
EU15 member states is actually slightly lower than the variation across US states, when Luxembourg
and the District of Columbia are excluded.
15intensive, second, a large fraction of manufacturing supplies innovative goods (in the form
of investment goods but also innovative consumer goods). Final goods sectors, including
services, on the other hand are typically not subject to large (patented) innovations but
rely on organisational changes possibly in relation to new technologies supplied by the
manufacturing sector. A good example in this respect is the ICT investment driven pro-
ductivity increase in retail, wholesale trade and banking in some countries, notably the
US. Also the two sectors di⁄er in the degree of competition, with manufacturing showing
smaller mark ups compared to ￿nal goods sectors. For calculating mark ups we use a
method suggested by Roeger (1995). There are marked di⁄erences between the US and
the EU. We ￿nd substantially higher mark ups in ￿nal goods in the EU15 (24% vs. 20%)
while mark ups in manufacturing are slightly lower in the EU15 (11% vs. 12%). Similar
results but with even stronger di⁄erences in manufacturing industries have been obtained
by Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008). The results on cross country di⁄erences in the
level of mark ups are interesting since they suggest a positive link between the level of
mark ups and R&D investment as suggested by our model. This comes out even clearer
in earlier work by Oliveira Martins and Price (2004) which shows that sectors with high
R&D intensities tend to have higher mark ups. Again the US belongs to the group of
countries with the highest mark ups.
It is a stylised fact that product markets are more regulated in the EU compared
to the US. Recent evidence can be found in Hoj et al. (2007). Section 1 of this paper
stresses especially entry barriers in the intermediate goods (manufacturing) sector as
being detrimental for innovative activities. To our knowledge estimates on entry barriers
for speci￿c sectors do not exist. Therefore we rely on the aggregate estimates provided by
Djankov et al. (2002). These estimates are particularly useful since they provide directly
quanti￿able evidence on costs of procedures and time that a start-up must bear before
the ￿rm can operate legally. This information can be directly used for the calibration of
the entry cost parameter in the model. The average entry cost per ￿rm is estimated to be
around 66 percent of GDP per capita in the whole sample. Their calculations show that
the European countries impose 2 to 60 times higher entry costs than the US. Based on
16the Djankov et al. (2002) methodology Kox (2005) re-estimated the start-up costs for the
EU. He estimates the EU average entry cost of setting up a standard ￿rm at 57:3 percent
of per capita GDP and only to 1:6% for the US.
3.2 Financial markets
It is a well known fact that the US has a more developed market for risk capital. In fact
venture capital ￿nancing of innovative start ups was invented in the US (see Bottazzi
and Rin (2002)). Even though venture capital ￿nancing has also become popular in the
US it still only amounts to 0:12% of GDP compared to 0:19% in the US7. There are
various studies indicating that access to ￿nance for innovating ￿rms are easier in the US.
A recent study by Aghion et al. (2007) even concludes that ￿nancial constraints related
to entry could be as important as labour market rigidities in terms of obstacles to growth.
Unfortunately, the available indicators on ￿nancial market developments cannot easily
be translated into quantitative measures of di⁄erences in risk premia8. However we can
use the model together with all the other observable information to calculate a country
speci￿c risk premium. Using the free entry condition (eq 21) and eliminating P A
t by using
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where rdit is the R&D-intensity: total R&D expenditure of the intermediate sector
in percentage of GDP9. Our calibrated risk-premia for the EU15 is signi￿cantly higher
then the one obtained for the US (2:5% vs. 1:6%). Is a 100 basis point di⁄erence in
the risk premium a plausible number? Some recent research on the e⁄ects of capital
market integration in the EU have used the US as a benchmark. Hardouvelis et al. (2004)
reports remaining di⁄erences of 100BP, while Baele et al. (2004) estimates that equity
7These ￿gures are calculated as an average over the period 2004-2006 (source: Meyer (2008)). Notice
however, some countries in the EU, notably those with a high tech specialisation such as the UK, Sweden
and Denmark have a share of venture capital investment that exceeds that of the US. However high tech
states in the US such as California have VC investment shares far larger than EU regions.
8Alternatively the risk premium can also be interpreted as the shadow price of the collateral constraint
for the ￿rm investing in intangible capital.
9See Appendix 2.
17and corporate bond risk premia di⁄er by about 50BP after coming down by about 100BP.
3.3 Knowledge production technology
Empirical evidence on output elasticities has recently been provided by Bottazzi and
Peri (2007) and Pessoa (2005). The growth rate of ideas were obtained from Pessoa
(2005) with the assumption of a 5% obsolescence rate. Pessoa (2005) also estimated
the semi-endogenous idea-production function for 21 OECD countries. In our model
the R&D elasticity of research labour (￿) is determined by the wage cost share in the
total R&D spending. Our calibrated values for the elasticity of research labour (￿), 0:40
and 0:44 respectively, and the stock of domestic intangible capital (￿), 0:62 and 0:70
resp., are very close to the ones reported in Pessoa (2005) (0:447 and 0:642 respectively).
According to the empirically given and calibrated parameters (see Table 1) the US exhibits
a more e¢ cient knowledge production technology as measured by the output elasticity of
production workers and the stock of domestic knowledge capital (A). Nevertheless, the EU
can achieve similar TFP growth rates because of higher technology spillover parameters
(see the Appendix for a more detailed discussion of the calibration). We set the level of
domestic stock of knowledge for the EU at 1 and the US domestic stock of knowledge
30% higher, at 1:3 which roughly corresponds to the US vs. EU ratio of the number of
patents in force registered by the WIPO in 200510.
3.4 Labour market and the skill composition of the labour force
We use information from DG ECFINs macroeconomic model QUEST III (see Ratto et al.
(2009)) to calibrate the labour market in the two regions. The estimates show a higher
labour supply elasticity in the case of the US. This together with higher labour taxes
and a higher value for leisure in the EU explains a higher employment rate in the US.
Labour force is disaggregated into three skill-groups: low-, medium- and high-skilled
labour11. Data on skill-speci￿c population shares, participation rates and wage-premia
102005 is the latest available year for most of the EU member states in the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) database.
11We de￿ne high skilled workers as that segment of the labour force that can potentially be employed in
the R&D sector, i. e. engineers and natural scientists and we take the high-skilled wages in the education
18are obtained from OECD (2006), the Labour Force Survey and Science and Technology
databases of EUROSTAT. The elasticity of substitution between di⁄erent labour types
(￿L) is one of the major issue addressed in the labour-economics literature. We follow
Caselli and Coleman (2006) which analysed the cross-country di⁄erences of the aggregate
production function when skilled and unskilled labour are imperfect substitutes. The
authors argue in favour of using the Katz and Murphy (1992) estimate of 1:4. We set
the e¢ ciency of low-skilled to ￿t the US and the EU production functions with the data.
The other e¢ ciency units are restricted by the labour demand equations which imply the

































3.5 R&D subsidies and taxes
The empirical evidence provided by Warda (1996 and 2006) indicates an average of 5
percentage point higher rate of R&D subsidies for the US based on the B-index.12 Larger
di⁄erences can be found in the case of labour taxation, with substantially higher tax rates
in the EU compared to the US (see EUROSTAT and Coenen et al. (2007)).
sector as proxy for the wage level of the R&D labour.
12See Appendix 3 for more details on the B-index and how it relates to tax parameters in the model.
19Table 1: EU15 - US Parameter Comparison
EU15 US Source
R&D sector
LHA 0.007 0.011 EUROSTAT/OECD
R&D intensity (%) 1.908 2.670 EUROSTAT/OECD
Stock of "ideas" (A) 1.000 1.300 WIPO (US-EU ratio of patents in force)
￿ 0.398 0.441 calibration (constrained by equations)
￿ 0.619 0.704 Bottazzi-Peri (2007)
￿ 0.363 0.279 Bottazzi-Peri (2007)
(R&D e¢ ciency) 0.082 0.090 calibration (constrained by equations)
Intermediate sector
markup 0.11 0.12 ECFIN
risk-premia on intangibles
(on annual basis) 0.025 0.016 calibration (constrained by equations)
￿xed entry costs 0.31 0.02 Djankov et al. (2002)
Final goods sector
mark up 0.242 0.205 own estimates
Skill distribution
sL 0.339 0.121 EUROSTAT/OECD
sM 0.592 0.803 EUROSTAT/OECD
sH 0.069 0.076 EUROSTAT/OECD
Employment rates
LL 0.575 0.654 EUROSTAT/OECD
LM 0.757 0.841 EUROSTAT/OECD
LH 0.842 0.944 EUROSTAT/OECD
￿L 1.400 1.400 Katz and Murphy (1992)
(elasticity of. substitution)
L 0.699 0.827 EUROSTAT/OECD
Skill premium % 34.60 39.00 EUROSTAT/OECD
(high vs. medium)
Skill premium % 23.27 49.25 EUROSTAT/OECD
(medium vs. low)
E¢ ciency levels
efL 0.183 0.126 calibration (constrained by equations)
efM 0.381 0.511 calibration (constrained by equations)
efH 1.08 1.618 calibration (constrained by equations)
Taxes and subsidies
B-index 0.98 0.93 Warda (2006)
Labour taxes 0.44 0.29 EUROSTAT/Coenen et al. (2007)
Labour Market
Labour adjustment cost 18 10 own estimates
(% of total add. wage costs)
Labour supply elasticity (1=￿) 1/4 1/.8 own estimates
Table 1 shows that the US has higher employment rates in all three skill categories.
In terms of skill composition, the US skill distribution is more tilted towards high skilled
20workers. The large di⁄erence of the corrected e¢ ciencies of high skilled labour between
US and EU27 are explained by the almost three times higher skill premia in the US.
4 Simulation results
This section tries to account for three stylized di⁄erences between the US and the EU15,
namely the productivity gap, the higher share of R&D spending and the higher skill
premium. Productivity per hour worked in purchasing power parities in the US exceeded
the EU15 level by 13% between 1998-2007. R&D intensity was 0:76%p higher in the US
and the gap in skill premia for high- versus medium-skilled workers was 4:4% .
4.1 Changing mark ups
Our estimates suggest that the US mark up in manufacturing exceeds the mark up in the
EU15 by 1% point. As shown in Table 8, this di⁄erence has a negligible e⁄ect on pro-
ductivity but explains some of the di⁄erence in R&D intensity. Notice, in our framework,
mark ups are required to cover ￿xed costs from innovative activities. Higher mark ups
thus stimulate entry of new innovative ￿rms and therefore the demand for R&D. However,
higher mark ups and therefore higher prices also exert a negative e⁄ect on the demand for
incumbents, the demand for physical capital declines. Because of these o⁄setting e⁄ects
a change in markup in manufacturing does hardly have any productivity e⁄ect. Higher
mark ups in US manufacturing do however explain 0:12% points of the di⁄erence in R&D
intensity which is more than 15% of the gap with the US, and also explain a small fraction
of the high skilled skill premium (see Table 2).
Product market competition in the ￿nal goods sector explains a larger fraction of the
productivity gap, namely 2:9%. As discussed in section 2.5, the higher factor demand
generated by higher competition in ￿nal output production leads primarily to a higher
level of physical capital while the long run level of TFP only changes slightly13 (see Table
3). It is interesting to note that the (nominal) R&D share also increases slightly in this
13In contrast to the theoretical discussion in section 2.5 and the appendix, there is a slight increase in
TFP because increased competition also increases labour supply of high skilled workers.
21case. This is to a large extent the result from an increase in wages, or the skill premium
which leads to an increase in the relative price of R&D.
Table 2: Increasing the mark-up in the intermediate good sector to US-level (11% to 12%)
Years 1 5 10 15 20 30 50 100 200
GDP -0.09 -0.25 -0.30 -0.34 -0.36 -0.38 -0.34 -0.17 -0.02
"Ideas/Patents" 0.03 0.52 1.17 1.76 2.31 3.26 4.72 6.72 7.86
Capital -0.01 -0.21 -0.44 -0.63 -0.76 -0.94 -1.07 -0.99 -0.80
Employment 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
-low 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
-medium 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
-high -0.20 -1.01 -1.03 -1.00 -0.98 -0.94 -0.88 -0.80 -0.75
-R&D 3.70 8.49 8.38 8.16 7.96 7.62 7.11 6.45 6.09
Consumption 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 -0.08 -0.10 -0.11 -0.07 0.11 0.26
Investment -0.26 -0.76 -0.88 -0.96 -1.01 -1.08 -1.09 -0.95 -0.79
Wages -0.03 -0.08 -0.14 -0.18 -0.20 -0.22 -0.19 -0.05 0.09
-low -0.06 -0.17 -0.23 -0.26 -0.28 -0.30 -0.27 -0.12 0.02
-medium -0.06 -0.16 -0.21 -0.25 -0.27 -0.28 -0.25 -0.11 0.03
-high 0.16 0.58 0.51 0.46 0.42 0.37 0.36 0.45 0.56
R&D price 6.16 5.58 4.87 4.23 3.66 2.72 1.36 -0.31 -1.17
Int. price 0.29 0.20 0.34 0.45 0.53 0.66 0.78 0.82 0.78
R&D intensity 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.12
Table 3: Decreasing the mark-up in the ￿nal good sector to US-level (24.2% to 20.5%)
Years 1 5 10 15 20 30 50 100 200
GDP 0.55 1.19 1.36 1.62 1.84 2.19 2.61 2.99 3.09
"Ideas/Patents" 0.02 0.15 0.23 0.30 0.37 0.50 0.72 1.08 1.32
Capital 0.06 0.94 1.80 2.46 2.99 3.79 4.74 5.54 5.74
Employment 0.43 0.52 0.27 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.23
-low 0.41 0.39 -0.13 -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -0.18 -0.16 -0.16
-medium 0.43 0.60 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.37
-high 0.30 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09
-R&D 1.80 1.39 1.03 1.04 1.07 1.10 1.13 1.10 1.04
Consumption 0.16 0.30 0.51 0.77 0.97 1.29 1.68 2.03 2.13
Investment 1.33 3.13 3.34 3.69 4.00 4.49 5.09 5.60 5.74
Wages 1.11 3.47 3.88 4.14 4.34 4.67 5.06 5.41 5.50
-low 1.06 3.56 4.18 4.46 4.66 4.97 5.35 5.68 5.78
-medium 1.10 3.40 3.75 3.99 4.20 4.53 4.93 5.28 5.38
-high 1.30 3.74 3.97 4.22 4.43 4.75 5.15 5.50 5.59
R&D price 5.12 4.39 4.47 4.67 4.85 5.10 5.35 5.40 5.28
Int. price 1.35 2.17 1.68 1.38 1.14 0.79 0.39 0.08 0.00
R&D intensity 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06
224.2 Reducing administrative start up costs
In this simulation we account for a 95% reduction in EU entry costs. According to our
simulations (see Table 4), entry barriers explain a productivity gap of around 1:4% and
about 40% of the lower EU R&D share. Decreasing entry costs lowers the pro￿t require-
ment for intermediate producers and thus increases entry of new ￿rms. Increased demand
for patents increases the demand for high skilled worker and leads to some relocation of
high skilled workers from production to the R&D sector and an increase in the wage of
high skilled workers and thus explains a small fraction of the di⁄erence in the skill pre-
mium of high skilled workers. Despite the wage increase, the price for patents falls because
of a productivity improving e⁄ect emanating from higher knowledge capital. Reducing
entry barriers is a more e¢ cient way of increasing productivity and knowledge investment
compared to an increase in mark ups because the former does not lead to an increase in
the price of intermediate goods.
Table 4: Decreasing the entry costs of the intermediate sector to the US-level
Years 1 5 10 15 20 30 50 100 200
GDP -0.04 -0.11 -0.06 0.00 0.06 0.20 0.47 1.00 1.43
"Ideas/Patents" 0.06 1.03 2.34 3.57 4.72 6.80 10.17 15.36 18.98
Capital 0.00 -0.04 -0.09 -0.11 -0.11 -0.06 0.15 0.70 1.23
Employment 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
-low -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
-medium -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
-high -0.49 -2.03 -2.12 -2.09 -2.07 -2.03 -1.96 -1.86 -1.80
-R&D 7.50 17.45 17.51 17.30 17.09 16.73 16.16 15.32 14.77
Consumption -0.05 -0.08 -0.02 0.05 0.11 0.26 0.54 1.07 1.49
Investment -0.04 -0.16 -0.16 -0.13 -0.09 0.02 0.27 0.80 1.25
Wages 0.05 0.13 0.18 0.23 0.29 0.41 0.65 1.12 1.49
-low 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.08 0.13 0.26 0.51 0.98 1.35
-medium -0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.06 0.12 0.24 0.49 0.97 1.35
-high 0.43 1.52 1.56 1.60 1.64 1.73 1.93 2.34 2.67
R&D price 12.77 11.69 10.52 9.46 8.51 6.87 4.40 1.00 -1.13
Int. price -0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.08 0.12 0.17 0.20 0.14 0.03
R&D intensity 0.29 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.31 0.30
234.3 Reducing risk premium on intangible capital
The simulation in Table 5 is designed as a 36% reduction in the risk premium of intangible
capital. Similar to start up costs, the ￿nancial friction constitutes an entry barrier by
requiring a higher discount rate for intermediate goods producers. The e⁄ects of reduc-
ing the risk premium on intangible capital are similar to a reduction of start up costs.
Our calibration suggests that ￿nancial frictions are nearly as important for explaining
productivity and knowledge investment di⁄erences than administrative start up costs.
Table 5: Decreasing the risk premia on intangibles to US-level
Years 1 5 10 15 20 30 50 100 200
GDP -0.04 -0.11 -0.06 0.00 0.07 0.21 0.48 0.98 1.34
"Ideas/Patents" 0.07 1.06 2.39 3.63 4.77 6.79 9.96 14.45 17.15
Capital 0.00 -0.04 -0.09 -0.11 -0.11 -0.05 0.16 0.70 1.16
Employment 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
-low -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
-medium -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
-high -0.50 -2.07 -2.13 -2.08 -2.04 -1.97 -1.85 -1.70 -1.61
-R&D 7.72 17.76 17.61 17.21 16.85 16.22 15.26 13.96 13.21
Consumption -0.04 -0.08 -0.02 0.05 0.12 0.27 0.54 1.04 1.39
Investment -0.05 -0.17 -0.16 -0.13 -0.08 0.03 0.28 0.79 1.18
Wages 0.05 0.14 0.18 0.23 0.29 0.41 0.64 1.08 1.39
-low 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.08 0.14 0.27 0.51 0.95 1.26
-medium -0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.06 0.12 0.25 0.49 0.94 1.26
-high 0.44 1.54 1.57 1.59 1.61 1.68 1.85 2.18 2.43
R&D price 13.14 11.92 10.61 9.43 8.39 6.61 4.01 0.65 -1.19
Int. price -0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.08 0.13 0.18 0.20 0.13 0.03
R&D intensity 0.30 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.31 0.28 0.27
4.4 R&D subsidies
Di⁄erences between Europe and the US concerning R&D subsidies are small. OECD esti-
mates (see Warda (1996, 2006)) suggest that the subsidy rate for R&D is about 5% points
higher in the US in terms of the B-index. Because of positive externalities associated with
R&D investment (in particular due to the positive e⁄ect of the knowledge capital stock
for R&D output), increasing subsidies in the EU to US levels would further close the
productivity gap between Europe and the US and raise the R&D expenditure share (see
Table 6). Subsidising R&D also increases wages/skill premium of high skilled workers,
24suggesting the presence of crowding out e⁄ects. This is consistent with empirical evidence
reported by Goolsbee (1998).
Table 6: Increasing the R&D subsidies to the US-level
Years 1 5 10 15 20 30 50 100 200
GDP 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.13 0.26 0.34
"Ideas/Patents" 0.02 0.27 0.60 0.90 1.18 1.67 2.41 3.43 4.00
Capital 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.19 0.30
Employment 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
-low 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04
-medium 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
-high -0.11 -0.50 -0.52 -0.51 -0.49 -0.47 -0.44 -0.41 -0.38
-R&D 1.90 4.30 4.25 4.15 4.05 3.89 3.63 3.30 3.12
Consumption 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.15 0.27 0.36
Investment -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.08 0.21 0.30
Wages 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.16 0.27 0.34
-low -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.04 0.10 0.21 0.29
-medium 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.14 0.25 0.32
-high 0.11 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.41 0.45 0.53 0.59
R&D price 3.20 2.92 2.61 2.32 2.07 1.63 0.98 0.14 -0.31
Int. price 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.01
R&D intensity 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06
4.5 Discussion of results (sensitivity analysis)
Our results show a clear ranking of those factors which can partially explain the three
stylised di⁄erences between the EU15 and the US.
Along the productivity dimension, the most important factor appears to be mark up
di⁄erences in ￿nal goods production. Entry barriers and risk premia in the ￿nancing of
start ups are signi￿cant as well and about equally important. Less important are di⁄er-
ences in R&D subsidies. The four factors explain about half of the labour productivity
gap between the EU and the US. There are other important di⁄erences between the EU
and the US, which we have identi￿ed in our calibration, such as di⁄erences in the skill
composition of the labour force and di⁄erences in the e¢ ciency of individual skill groups.
The US has a larger share of high skilled workers and high skilled workers in the US have
higher e¢ ciency levels. Both factors are likely to contribute signi￿cantly in explaining the
remaining productivity gap. These di⁄erences are likely to be related to di⁄erences in the
education system and migration policies which have not been the focus of our analysis.
25Knowledge investment (R&D intensity) is to a large extent explained by entry condi-
tions in intermediate goods production, i.e. both by di⁄erences in administrative entry
costs and ￿nancing conditions. Lowering entry barriers unambiguously increases the de-
mand for patents. Market structure in both ￿nal and intermediate goods production has
ambiguous e⁄ects on knowledge investment. Increased competition in ￿nal goods pro-
duction increases both the demand for labour in production and for R&D labour via an
increase in the demand for intermediate goods, i.e. it does not lead to a relocation of
resources from production to research but only has an e⁄ect on research via an increase
in the supply of labour. An increase in the mark up of intermediate goods increases the
demand for patents because it increases the present discounted value of pro￿ts in interme-
diate goods production, but since it is associated with an increase in intermediate goods
prices there is a reduction of demand for intermediates, which partly o⁄sets the positive
e⁄ect from increased pro￿ts.
The factors explaining knowledge investment also explain the skill premium between
high skilled and medium skilled workers. In particular the increase in the intermediate
mark up and the reduction in risk premia explain this skill premium. 14
Since there are large di⁄erences concerning labour supply elasticities and relatively
little information about elasticity of substitution between skills, the appendix contains
a sensitivity analysis w.r.t. these two parameters. It is shown that our results are not
a⁄ected by changing the parameter values within plausible bands.
14The model is less successful in explaining the wage di⁄erentials between medium and low skilled
workers. But it must be kept in mind that the model has not been designed to analyse the skill premium
between these two types, which is determined to a large part by exogenous di⁄erences in their e¢ ciency
levels.
26Table 7: Full structural change of the EU economy
Years 1 5 10 15 20 30 50 100 200
GDP 0.38 0.71 0.93 1.29 1.64 2.28 3.35 5.04 6.17
"Ideas/Patents" 0.20 3.02 6.72 10.16 13.34 19.00 27.96 40.99 49.25
Capital 0.05 0.63 1.15 1.58 1.99 2.73 4.02 6.14 7.61
Employment 0.53 0.56 0.30 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.20
-low 0.41 0.41 -0.09 -0.17 -0.19 -0.19 -0.18 -0.16 -0.14
-medium 0.44 0.61 0.44 0.43 0.41 0.39 0.36 0.33 0.31
-high -1.00 -5.47 -5.67 -5.56 -5.47 -5.30 -5.04 -4.68 -4.46
-R&D 22.59 49.33 48.74 47.81 46.97 45.50 43.23 40.08 38.19
Consumption 0.07 0.12 0.43 0.80 1.15 1.78 2.84 4.50 5.62
Investment 0.96 1.98 2.10 2.44 2.80 3.47 4.62 6.44 7.67
Wages 1.20 3.69 4.13 4.47 4.78 5.36 6.32 7.80 8.80
-low 0.98 3.31 3.97 4.34 4.66 5.24 6.20 7.69 8.68
-medium 1.02 3.16 3.55 3.89 4.21 4.80 5.79 7.32 8.33
-high 2.43 7.75 7.99 8.24 8.49 8.94 9.73 10.98 11.83
R&D price 40.35 36.46 33.03 30.09 27.45 22.91 16.08 6.89 1.49
Int. price 1.59 2.31 2.09 2.01 1.95 1.83 1.61 1.19 0.86
R&D intensity 0.91 1.06 1.04 1.02 1.00 0.97 0.92 0.86 0.82
Table 8: US-EU gaps explained by di⁄erences in exogenous variables
Y/L Skill premium R&D
high vs. intensity
medium
Increase mark up (intermediates) 0.00 1.76 0.12
Lower mark up (￿nal goods) 2.85 0.27 0.06
Reducing entry barrier 1.43 0.71 0.30
Reducing risk premia 1.34 1.55 0.27
R&D subsidies 0.34 0.36 0.06
Total 5.96 4.65 0.82
Initial gap 13.00 4.40 0.76
5 Conclusions
Reaching approximately US levels of productivity and R&D spending are among the most
prominent Lisbon targets agreed by EU governments in the year 2000. This paper uses a
semi-endogenous growth model to identify possible sources for the productivity and the
R&D spending gap between the EU and the US as well as larger skill premia for high
skilled workers in the US. Identifying the main causes for these di⁄erences is a prerequisite
for de￿ning possible reform areas which would contribute mostly towards closing these
27gaps. The analysis in this paper suggests that di⁄erences in the functioning of product
market are the main causes of productivity di⁄erentials between the EU and the US.
Another important obstacle to higher productivity levels are entry barriers in innovating
sectors. Reducing these would both increase the R&D share and labour productivity
in the long run. Another interesting result is the partial ambiguity between estimated
mark ups and innovation. While mark up estimates in the ￿nal goods production sector
can be seen as indicators of a lack of competition and a reduction of mark ups would
consequently increase productivity, the interpretation of mark ups in innovating sectors
is more complicated. In these sectors mark ups capture innovation rents and they must
therefore be seen as the outcome of innovative activities of ￿rms, leading to products which
are more complicated to imitate by competitiors. The factors which explain productivity
and knowledge investment di⁄erentials between the US and the EU also explain the
di⁄erence in the skill premium between high and medium skilled workers. Our analysis
thus suggest that closing the productivity gap with the US would be associated with a
slightly larger wage inequality. The structural features we have concentrated on in this
paper can explain a signi￿cant share of the productivity gap between the EU and the
US. Our model calibration also shows that there are other di⁄erences between the two
economies related to human capital endowments, in particular a larger share of high skilled
workers and a larger e¢ ciency dispersion across skill groups in the US. These are largely
orthogonal to the structural features and policies we have concentrated on in this paper
and are most likely related to di⁄erences in education and migration policies. Assessing
the impact of these di⁄erences would be an interesting task for future research.
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31Appendix 1. Deriving the steady-state R&D share
and the determinants of labour productivity
The Economic Environment
For illustration purposes we consider a simpli￿ed structure of the original economic model
with two types of labour, low- and high-skilled and Ricardian households with inelastic
labour supply.
We assume that monopolistically competitive ￿rms in the ￿nal goods sector use an At
variety of intermediates and an aggregate (LY) of the low- and high-skilled labour types



















￿H; ￿L + ￿H = ￿:
















t = Lt = L0e
nt: (A2)





_ Kt = Yt ￿ Ct ￿ ￿Kt





















￿￿(s￿t)ds; ￿ > n (A5)














where ￿ denotes the inverse gross mark-up in the ￿nal goods sector. Finally, the arbitrage











t , fca is the (constant) proportion of entry cost in terms of the price of
R&D products and ￿ < 1 is the e⁄ective (possibly negative) tax- (subsidy) rate on pro￿t
￿nanced from lump-sum taxes.
Assume also that along the balanced growth path the domestic and foreign stock of
knowledge grows at the same rate: gA = gAw
BGP growth rates
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n: (A8)



















(1 ￿ ￿): (A1￿ )





gA + n: (A10)
Given the price of R&D designs, which is determined by equation (A7), the Research
Institute maximizes its pro￿t when the marginal productivity equals to the real wage








t ; or (A11)
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= gY ￿ gA: (A13)





r ￿ (gY ￿ gA)
: (A7￿ )
Intermediate sector￿ s pro￿t
The pro￿t-maximization of the intermediate sector requires the following ￿rst order
condition:
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where from the symmetric structure of the model follows that
i




and the intermediate sector￿ s pro￿t is given by




Steady state R&D intensity




￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) Yt
At
r ￿ (gY ￿ gA)
: (A16)
Notice that P A











￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) Yt
At
r ￿ (gY ￿ gA)
: (A17)
Therefore the steady-state R&D share, sA:
sA =
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)gA




Let us denote the ￿rst part of the expression which is the R&D share without ￿xed costs
in the intermediate sector by snfx and denote the ￿nal and intermediate sector￿ s mark-ups
by mpf and mpi respectively, where 1+mpf = 1
￿ and 1+mpi = 1















































Equation (A18) and (A19) reveal that the steady state R&D share is determined by
- the mark-ups in the ￿nal and intermediate sector (mpf, mpi) ,
- the e⁄ective tax/subsidy of the intermediate sector (￿) ,
- long-run growth-rate of population and ideas (gA, n) ,
- the equilibrium interest rate (r).
- the entry costs share (fca).
Notice that Table 8 corresponds to the signs of the e⁄ects on the parameters above:
decreasing the mark up in the ￿nal, and increasing it in the intermediate sector indeed
increased the R&D share, higher subsidies resulted in higher R&D intensity and decreasing
the entry barriers had the strongest positive e⁄ect on R&D.
Steady state LHA=LHY ratio
To calculate the ratio of high-skilled labour devoted R&D relative to the ￿nal good sector￿ s
high-skilled employment we can use the assumption that wages are equal across sectors.
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Comparing (A19) and (A20) we can see a major di⁄erence between the "nominal" and
"real" ratio of resources devoted to R&D: the "real" ratio measured in terms of labour
does not depend on the ￿nal good sector￿ s mark-up (mpf) while the "nominal" R&D
intensity is decreasing in it.
Skill premium
From the ratio of high-skilled R&D employment relative to the ￿nal goods sector￿ s high-


















35Using the ￿rst order conditions for employment in the ￿nal goods sector (eqs. A6), the



















This expression shows, the skill premium is proportional to the output elasticity of skill
speci￿c labour in ￿nal goods production, it depends inversely on the relative supply of
skilled labour and it is a positive function of the real R&D share (and therefore all the
parameters which determine the real R&D share).
Labour productivity













































































The balanced growth path saving rate sK can be obtained from (A3) and (A14￿ ) using
that iK = r + ￿.
sK =
￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)(n + gk + ￿)
r + ￿
(A26)
Finally, combining (A25) and (A8￿ ) we obtain that output per capita along the balanced
growth path is a function of the structural parameters and proportional to the exogenously
growing labour force and the international stock of knowledge
yt =
￿
































Note that decreasing the ￿nal good mark-up (increasing ￿) will always lead to higher
output per capita. However the e⁄ect of intermediate mark-ups is not straightforward
because both ￿ and sLA depends on the inverse of gross intermediate goods mark-up, ￿.
One can show that the ￿rst order derivative of yt in terms of R&D labour share (sLA) is
36also not necessarily positive. However, under our calibration to the data both derivatives
are positive. Note that our simulation results also con￿rm these observations.
37Appendix 2. Calibrating Knowledge production para-
meters
The driving equation system of the semi-endogenous technological change in discrete time











































Kt = Atxt (g)
The ￿rst equation is the spillover-augmented version of Jones (1995) R&D production.
This form of R&D equation accounts for international spillovers almost identically to the
speci￿cation of Bottazzi and Peri (2007). Equation (b) states the balanced-growth rela-
tionship between the growth of ideas gA(= gAw) and population gn, equation (c) shows the
￿rst order condition of R&D production, equation (d) is the de￿nition of R&D-intensity:
total R&D expenditure of the intermediate sector in percentage of GDP. Equation (e)
states the free-entry condition between the pro￿t of the intermediate sector (￿t), and the
per unit price of R&D inventions (P A) and the ￿xed (entry) cost FCA. Equation (f)
de￿nes the rental rate of intangible capital which takes into account that households pay
income tax at rate tK
t on the period return of intangibles and they receive tax subsidies
at rate ￿A. Since one unit of capital is used to produce one unit of intermediate good
(xt), equation (g) states the identity between the total intermediate goods production and
physical capital under symmetric equilibrium.
We set the level of domestic stock of knowledge (A) for the EU at 1 and the US
domestic stock of knowledge 30% higher, at 1:3 which roughly corresponds to the US vs.
EU ratio of the number of patents in force registered by the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO). Although we do not have direct estimates of ￿, $, ￿ and ￿ for
each region respectively, we can use the existing literature and the model restrictions to
get calibrated values for them. Data on the R&D share of labour (LHA








is obtained from EUROSTAT, the values of gA and gn are given in
our baseline model15. Note that in our model the output elasticity of research labour (￿)
corresponds to the wage share of R&D labour in the total R&D spending (equation c).
These values together with the restrictions of the balanced growth dynamics and other
variables of the baseline pin down P A. In order to set ￿ and $ in the ￿rst step we
express the sum of these two parameters from equation (b). In the second step we use
15Pessoa (2005) provides estimates for the growth of patents or ideas in various OECD countries at
an average of gA = 0:057. The population growth gn is obtained from EUKLEMS potential output
calculations.
38the estimated long-term relationship between ￿ and ￿ from Bottazzi and Peri (2007) to
approximate $ separately. The authors do not estimate directly ￿ and $, however their
estimated cointegration vector contains two coe¢ cients ￿ and ￿, satisfying the following









The estimated values for these two coe¢ cients show fairly big variations under the di⁄er-
ent regressions, and it might be inadequate to apply these long-term coe¢ cients on our





vary less, furthermore, imposing the ratio of the long-term parameters instead of their
exact values is also less restrictive16. In the last step we subtract this value from the sum
of ￿ and $ as we calculated from equation (b) earlier. Finally, we normalize the stock of
foreign ideas to one and therefore ￿ can be obtained from expression (a).
The calibration of the parameters in intermediate goods production relies on the entry
costs estimations of Djankov et al. (2002), and the estimations for R&D related subsidies
(￿A) of Warda (2006). Given the stock of domestic ideas (At), equation (g) pins down
the per ￿rm quantity of intermediate goods production. The pro￿t of a representative
intermediate ￿rm is determined by its production and the net mark-up of the sector17.
All other variables given, the arbitrage equation (e) gives the rental rate of intangible
capital, iA
t . The B-indices published in Warda (2006) can be applied to calibrate ￿A and
tK. Finally, we use the de￿nition of equation (f) to obtain as residual the calibrated















16The full sample consists of ￿fteen OECD countries including the US and ten member states of the
European Union.
17We use the net mark-up of the manufacturing sector calculated in EUKLEMS to obtain ￿, the inverse
of the gross mark-up in the intermediate sector.
39Appendix 3. The tax treatment of intangible capital
The model is formulated in such a way that statutory corporate tax rates, depreciation
allowances and tax credits can be incorporated in the analysis. This section explains how
the tax measures in the model relate to Warda￿ s (1996) B-index which serves as a compre-
hensive measure of the tax treatment of R&D as, for example, advocated by the OECD.
Algebraically the B index is equal to the after tax cost of a Euro expenditure on R&D,
divided by one minus the corporate income tax rate (tK). Apart from the corporate in-
come tax rate, the relevant tax parameters for an investor in R&D are the investment tax
credit (￿) and the present discounted value of depreciation allowances (Alt). Depreciation
allowances depend on the corporate tax rate and the depreciation scheme for a speci￿c
investment good as de￿ned in the national tax laws. Standard depreciation schemes are
declining balance and straight line depreciation as well as combinations of both. In the
model we implicitly assume a declining balance scheme since it yields a simple representa-
tion for the user cost of capital. With a declining balance scheme, the present discounted
value at period t of depreciation allowances of an investment good with unit value in t




























The B-index is de￿ned as
B ￿ index =
(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ Alt)
(1 ￿ tK)
and one obtains the standard neoclassical user cost of capital (cc) when multiplying the
B-index with the sum of the real interest rate and the rate of depreciation. Using the
de￿nition of Alt it can be seen immediately that Warda￿ s user cost approach can be linked
directly to the user cost formula (6) used in the model
cc =
(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ Alt)
(1 ￿ tK)
(r + ￿) =
(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ t￿
r+￿)
(1 ￿ tK)
(r + ￿) =
(1 ￿ ￿)(r + ￿) ￿ tK￿
(1 ￿ tK)
:
40Appendix 4. Robustness of US-EU gaps explained by
di⁄erences in exogenous variables
We checked the robustness of the US-EU gaps explained by the model with respect to
the elasticity of substitution between skills (￿L) and the labour-supply elasticity (1=￿).
The following tables compare the baseline simulations with two alternative scenarios a.)
by setting ￿L to 2, close to the upper bound of the estimated elasticity of substitution
between skill groups according to the empirical literature (Katz and Murphy (1992)) and
b.) by imposing more and c.) less elastic labour supply (setting ￿ to 3 and 5 instead of
4). The simulations suggest that under the empirically plausible range of the elasticity of
substitution between skill-groups and of the elasticity of labour supply, the results do not
change signi￿cantly.
Table 9: Productivity gap under higher EOF between skill groups
Y/L Skill premium R&D
high vs. intensity
medium
Lower mark up (￿nal goods) 2.86 0.22 0.06
Increase mark up (intermediates) 0.01 0.57 0.12
Reducing entry barrier 1.48 1.43 0.30
Reducing risk premia 1.37 1.26 0.27
R&D subsidies 0.34 0.29 0.06
Total 6.06 3.78 0.81
Initial gap 10.90 4.40 0.76
Table 10: Productivity gap under with less elastic labour supply
Y/L Skill premium R&D
high vs. intensity
medium
Lower mark up (￿nal goods) 2.90 0.36 0.06
Increase mark up (intermediates) 0.00 0.78 0.12
Reducing entry barrier 1.44 1.95 0.30
Reducing risk premia 1.35 1.73 0.27
R&D subsidies 0.34 0.40 0.06
Total 6.03 5.22 0.81
Initial gap 10.90 4.40 0.76
41Table 11: Productivity gap under with more elastic labour supply
Y/L Skill premium R&D
high vs. intensity
medium
Lower mark up (￿nal goods) 2.85 0.27 0.06
Increase mark up (intermediates) 0.00 1.76 0.12
Reducing entry barrier 1.43 0.71 0.30
Reducing risk premia 1.34 1.55 0.27
R&D subsidies 0.33 0.36 0.06
Total 5.95 4.65 0.82
Initial gap 10.90 4.40 0.76
42